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'Seif-Intefrest, Social ifar Policy aFnd $ui Ia' !'robl~ns"
John P+ Fln
chool of' Social WorkWetrn 1 c higSan binvers it:y
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Three propsltlont a 1e explo[ed in th I paper whliL tie the<onnection hetwen soclal welfar policy and socil prorlems to the
onstruc t of pru of self-ntert,, The first; It, that self-interest (ite., "self" as individal, group or organizatiosn) is a
lynarri In social welfare policy formulatIon. the second pt.upo)silion
Is that our characteriaatlon of the welfare echange as a unilateraltransfer obscures the Intr.relationship bet.en social w i'are policy
a0d social problem and tnat rathcr, the social welfare chane iibtlaceraL. The third proposition b that perceptiOr of newly-found
self-Interests In alternative policies provides incentives toJ support
new policy opt-ions, This conceptualization has useful Implications
for achieving egalitar'ian rearrangements in a social system). Some
enmples are pro0vided below, after a discussion of" the propositions.
Ideally) one migh~t qeeally a'ssu m that the-re Is a constructive
re'latioenship. een the societal recogni tion of its social problems
and -the social welfare policies which giv e shape to Its social welfare
progr ams. However, It is hard to find an y compr.ehensive theory of
soci&l problems and social wel for e pol:icy. Mactoo and Mlsbet have
observed on t~ree occas ions over th e last decade t.hat a comrehensive
theory of social, problems dees not exist (Kiteuse and spector. l9J3:
407). NeIther does ons find a roriprehesrole t~eory of social welfare
policy . Yet, i-n a mdr society ostensi bly <oriitted to rational
and democratic problem solving, the conn ctionl between social policy
appears more .serendipitous than planlned.
Public and pri.vate so~ial wefare programs are georrally aimed
at provliig some consensual minimum standard of heal)th and decency.
Such p}rogram are cOnm y' assumed to be unllateial trans~fers of
wealth. from onepopulation} category to another, geneally from the
t top downward". The recognition of "upward transfers has only re-
ceritly received any popul:ar recognition (Stern, 1973; Tusslng, 1914)
and the identification of reciprocal exchanges In welf[are relationship-
has only recently received schlar analysis (Pruger, ;gya7}.
The writer wishes to grettiully acknowledge the as'wistance ofRiuhard tloettchez and Willia lai urian, School of Socal Wk. Western
Mid ~ian Unrtrity, for critiquing earlier drafts of tnis~ paper.
This writer assumes that there is a reciprocal interdependence
between the providers and the receivers of social welfare programs
and explores one particular aspect of that exchange. A proposition
explored here is that self-interest is a dynamic in social welfare
policy formulation and that such a dynamic is founded on the basic
assumption of reciprocal interdependence. The perception of newly-
found self-interests obtainable in alternative social welfare policy
options is examined here as a factor in inducing purposive policy
change.
It Is proposed here that the common characterization of the
welfare relationship as a unilateral transfer has obscured the con-
nection between the problem and policy. The late Richard Titmuss
refers to social policy as relating to unilateral transfers (e.g.,
grants or Tgftst and economic policy as relating to markets and ex-
changes and bilateral transfers (Titmuss, 1968: 22). On the contrary,
conceptualizing the welfare relationship as being comprised of
reciprocal exchanges forces us to look at the bilateral nature of
polfcy benefits with social and economic policy being inseparable.
Inasmuch as "downward" redistributive policies have received abundant
attention, and while not denying the efficacy and promise of ex-
ploring the distributive effects of "upward" transfers, this paper
will focus on the possibility that there are incentives held by
those population categories who are in positions to influence policy
change and who, coincidentally and concomitantly, are beneficiaries
In provider roles.
The identification of those incentives which relate favorably
to newly-found self-interests may hold some promise for a more equit-
able distribution of the burden of social problems and the benefits
of social welfare policies. It is proposed here that policy change
is likely to occur when those in advantaged positions are able to
perceive newly-found self-interests and support the associated new
policy options. This "principle of substitution" (see Zeckhauser and
Shaeffer, 1968: 43) or principle of willingness, founded on the
perception of self-interest, may provide a dynamic for policy change
In situations where Inequality and/or repressive policies heretofore
relied only upon moral exhortation or legislative or judicial mandate
for egalitarian relief.
SELF-INTEREST: THE EFFICACY OF THE CONCEPT
The fields of social problems and social welfare policy are
often thought to be ordered by the moral or humanistic motivations
of those who legislate and/or manage the welfare system. The wel-
fare system has also been observed to be influenced by the social
control functions performed (Flynn, 1973). There is also con-
siderable literature supporting the notion that "social" problems
and the pursuit of policy solutions are related to another dynamic,
i.e., the incentives associated with self-interest. We will now
survey some of the "self-interest literature". Although reality
is not neatly divisible into economic, political and social theory,
the following section will provide the survey in that order, follow-
ing an observation on social problems theory.
Social Problems Theory. Kitsuse and Spector reject the
traditional social disorganization and value-conflict approaches
to the study of social problems and offer a process approach to
the subject. They view social problems as "the activities of
groups making assertions of grievances and claims" with respect to
some putative conditions. (Spector and Kitsuse, 1973; see also
Ross and Staines, 1972). They argue that the subject matter of a
process approach contains three elements: a theory of moral indig-
nation, a theory of natural history, (Spector and Kitsuse, 1972)
and a theory of interests, since:
any of the groups that participate in the
process of definition do so in order to
pursue or protect their own social, political,
economic and other interests.
(Kitsuse and Spector, 1973: 418).
Economic Theory. The literature of classical utilitarianism
(as with, say, Jeremy Bentham) is entirely consonant with this view;
that is, the main proposition is that, generally speaking, the great-
est social good would be produced by pursuit of self-interest. Here,
self-interest is seen as the dynamic explaining social action and the
rationale for self-directed behavior and goal-seeking. (Heilbroner,
1967: 116-22 and Mencher, 1967: 63). Even Marx (albeit from the
perspective of class consciousness) said that there was "a social
class that was forced by the conditions of its daily life to fight
for a self-interest which was also the common interest of mankind".
(Harrington, 1972: 13).
Compare that view with the Hobbesian contention that "each
member of society had a self-interest in limiting the unbridled
egotism of his neighbors". (Harrington, 1972: 35). In this same
context (i.e., that self-interest is the very warp or woof of the
social fabric), Mencher recalled that classical capitalism, in the
person of Adam Smith, insisted that self-interest motivations were
"the foundations of social responsibility". (Mencher, 1967: 67).
Political Theor. Political theory, is, perhaps,a more
proliic source of interest-oriented literature inasmuch as poli-
tical behavior is, by definition, influence behavior. Generally
speaking, the construct of "interest group behavior" is, by its
very nature, suggestive of self-interest in political action.
More specifically, however, the identification of incentives for
self-interest can be found in the literature. (Clark and Wilson,
1961: Bernard, 1938).
Charles Lindblom has suggested that a more efficacious
technique for purposeful intervention in the policy arena is the
playing out of "partisan analysis"; that is, influence behavior is
said to be more predictably effective when one policy maker iden-
tifies options which also serve the values of other policy makers
to whom persuasion is directed. (Llndblom, 1968: 65, 95). In
such conditions, the various policy goals of the parties involved
are said not to be challenged.
In the Interorganizational arena, it has often been noted that
organizations act so as to protect, preserve or expand their domains,
regardless of the service function assigned by the community or
supra-system. (See Warren, 1971: Levine and White, 1961).
In studying power relationships in intraorganizational
behavior, Etzioni has identified (among other types) an orientation
toward organizational involvement on the part of members that is
said to be "calculative". (Etzioni, 1961: 11-13). Such an orien-
tation, said to be essentially an orientation of self-interest,
was observed by Boettcher in his test of Etzioni's compliance theory
in a welfare system (Boettcher, 1973).
More specifically, in terms of interracial group relations,
self-interest incentives have been seen as a key dynamic in organiz-
ing political behavior. Carmichael and Hamilton, in exploring the
viability of coalition-making, deal gingerly with the dangers involved
in cooptation. Yet, they suggest that after first developing a strong
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power base within the minority group, "all parties to the coalition
must perceive a mutually beneficial goal based on the conception of
each part of his own self-interest". (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1968:
77T In this same context, Norval Glenn has indicated that "self-
interest is the most basic and important force underlying white
policy and action vis a vis blacks". (cited in Burkey, 1971: 74).
Social Theory. Functional orientations in sociology, by
virtue of their emphasis upon system requisites, perhaps run the
risk of overlooking the more idiosyncratic incentives of social
actors; that is, the focus is generally more upon system outcomes
rather than incentives as inputs to social action in a system.
In one study of the incentives of local actors in social
welfare planning and policy-making, a relationship was observed
between the self-interest incentives of participants and the parti-
cular roles that some actors fulfilled in initiating social action.
Initiators of community and region-wide planning activity in estab-
lishing mental health services were observed as being moved pri-
marily by concrete, tangible or material incentives in which self-
(i.e., personal, organizational or community) interests were to be
served. (Flynn, 1973a).
William Ryan, in perhaps more caustic though no less accurate
fashion, has called the latent functions of welfare liberalism into
question. Ryan speaks of the function of "victim-blaming" in which
'the consequences of social problems are confusedly intercharged
with the causes of social dysfunction. He states that liberal
victim-blamers either change the poor man or "cool him out" so as
to "reconcile [their] own self-interest" [with] the prompting of
humanitarian impulses". (Ryan, 1972: 26). This, of course, is
little more than a modern version of the ancient Pharaoh's main-
tenance of the "vissier" for performance of welfare functions or
the medieval and later Christian perversion of "making oneself God's
debtor". In either case, seemingly altruistic behavior serves the
interest of the primary actor initiating the welfare relationship.
SELF-INTEREST AND SOCIAL WELFARE
The classical, common and pervasive view of social welfare's
uniqueness among social institutions as a vehicle for unilateral
exchange is no better illustrated than by Edmund A. Smith. Smith
argues that social welfare as a social institution differs from
other social institutions; that is, political, economic and reli-
gious/patriotic institutions are said to be expressions of collective
social concern for collectivities of populations. All individuals,
in laying out and setting forth the laws, norms and labeling of
social categories, are said to be collectively serving their own
interests (e.g., "making America safe for democracy"; keeping "crime
off the streets", etc.). Such a characterization is thought not to
be true of social welfare institutions. Welfare institutions are,
rather, thought to be the social expression of the collective concern
for individual conditions (Smith, 1965: 17-23); for example, while
the aged and/or permanently and totally disabled may rightfully lay
claim to the privileges of dependence, the social relationship is
assumed to be a unilateral exchange in that benefits accrue to the
individual at the largesse of the collectivity. The only interest
assumed to be served is for the needy individual, or, perhaps a
hated dependent group. The self-interest of the collectivity as
donor is generally not considered.
Assuming, again, that the welfare relationship should more
accurately be cast as a bilateral or reciprocal exchange among
actors, a reconceptualizition of the exchange system is in order.
This is to say that self-interest behavior on the part of actors is
no different in the social weltare institutions. A case in point
is provided by Gans in his enumeration of some fifteen functions
of poverty (which, of course, at times gives rise to public assis-
tance policies). Included among the functions of the poor and the
phenomenon of poverty are the provision of a low-wage labor pool,
the assurance of jobs for human service professionals, the mainten-
ance of the status of the non-poor in the stratification system,
and the contribution of the poor in stabilizing the political pro-
cess, since the poor vote less and the political system is able to
ignore them. (Gans, 1972). Hence, one might see here the bilateral
or multilateral self-interests served for other than those generally
assumed to be at the bottom and at the receiving end of social
relationships.
A SELF-INTEREST MODEL
David Gil offers a useful model in developing a framework for
social welfare policy analysis in the self-interest context. For
purposes of this paper, only three aspects of that framework will
be discussed here. The first aspect is Gil's position that the
crucial dynamic for change is the education of the elite* to perception
*These actors are referred to as "elites" in Etzioni's sense
of being those whose power subordinates the participation of others
rather than in the context of a pyramidal power structure. Hence,
those in positions of setting the parameters of policy are policy
power elites, as with voters, public opinion makers and other, more
typical conceptions of decision-makers.
of self-interest in policy change. The second aspect of the Gil
model is the common domains of social policy. The third aspect
is the mechanisms by which the domains of social policy are reg-
ulated. (Gil, 1970; 1973).
Perception of Self-Interest. The first major aspect of the
Gil model, which essentially provides the nexus of this paper, is
the contention that the source of energy for a value system in any
society is the perception of self-interest; that is, the priority
ranking of social values are reflective of the self-interests of
its members. Assuming the validity of that point of view (and,
indeed, the preceding discussion was devoted to surveying the
literature for support from other sources), it is further contended
that the major dynamic for policy change is the education of decision-
making elites to newly perceived self-interests; that is to say that,
if a public remains unchallenged or uninformed as to what its
interests are, there is no chance for change in the institutionalized
inequality of rights and statuses. However, if such publics can be
educated to the recognition that many patterns and activities do
not serve their (i.e., individual, group, organizational or community)
interests, the potential for new and alternative, and possibly egal-
itarian, social policies is presented. In other words, such a con-
ceptualization takes the reality of inequality and the hope of equality
out of the arena of "zero-sum" games. Or, stated another way,
equality is redefined as a distributable, rather than a fixed and
finite, commodity.
The Domains of Social Policy. It is observed by Gil that there
are three common domains over which social policy provides regulation.
The first is the regulation of the over-all quality of life; the sec-
ond is the regulation of the circumstances of living of individuals;
the third is the regulation of the relationships of the society's
members, in various groupings and in society as a whole. These three
components of domain are, assumedly, never left to chance in any
society. Their regulation is developed through laws, norms, customs
and other patterned behavior.
Examples may be found in separatist and discriminatory public
school systems, on the one hand, or in court-ordered desegretation
plans, on the other; the nature of the domain may also be observed
in the various behaviors of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in terms
of how the rights of reservation Indians are variously exploited,
protected or advocated.
The Mechanisms of Policy Alteration. In Gil's framework, the
mechanisms by which the domains are altered or maintained are:
1) resource development, 2) status allocation, 3) rights distribution,
and 4) the linkage between status and rights. Gil subsumes that
which is generally referred to as economic policy under the more gen-
eral rubric of social policy. In fact, the mechanisms of policy
alteration, as they are played out, are said to often be determined
by economic policies.
In the mechanism of resource development, a society's decisions
regarding the development of its resources and its priorities are
held to be the first means of regulation of domain. Social policiesin this area may be seen as effecting the manner and extent to which
life-sustaining and life-enhancing goods and services are developed
and distributed. This mechanism is clearly illustrated in the fed-
eral government's interest being served by retaining water or mineral
rights over Indian reservation lands. This fact was clearly notedby critics such as Senator Edward Kennedy regarding Wounded Knee in
1973 who obviously recognized the bilateral nature of the welfare
exchange. (Wassaja, 1973). The residents need not to have been
reminded, or course, as they were no doubt familiar with the problem.
Secondly, social policies are said to effect the manner and
extent to which statuses are allocated vis a vis the social positions
to which people are assigned. This second mechanism allocates indi-
viduals to positions and allocates the positions needing fulfillment
to individuals. This process is manifested in manpower allocations,divisions of labor and the association of particular individuals and
units with certain roles. This mechanism is manifest in the alloca-
tion of certain social categories to, say, migrant laborers, as with
certain groups of southern blacks, southwest chicanos and Appalachian
whites.
By the third mechanism (the distribution of rights) social
policies are seen as the alteration of the legitimacy with which
various actors in a social system may lay claim to the real and sym-bolic, and acquired and ascribed, rewards and entitlements. Examples
of applications of the rights mechanism are found, explicitly, in the
Civil Rights Act and minimum wage legislation; symbolic devices arefound in alterations in labeling, as with "chairpersons", rather than
"chairman", etc.
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The fourth mechanism, the linkage between status and rights,
is manifested in the manner and extent to which the rewards and en-
titlements become associated with particular statuses. That is,
certain privileges and prerogatives become associated with parti-
cular roles and positions. An illustration of the linkage between
status and right can be found, informally, in the practice of "if
you're black, stay back". More formally, poll taxes and voter
registration tests have patterned the claim to rewards and entitle-
ments. Another example might be the right of the donor in welfare
relationships to set the conditions of receipt (e.g., as with
eligibility standards and moral codes of conduct). Another, yet
obverse, example might be the right of beneficiaries in social
insurance plans to lay claim to benefits, without question, once
eligibility is established inasmuch as entitlement is established
in advance (i.e., a universal characteristic of social insurance
as opposed to public assistance).
In summary, social policy change may be defined as an alteration
in any one or more of the four mechanisms. The maintenance of the
current state of all four of the mechanisms is the retention of the
status quo in social relationships. A change in any one provides
opportunity for new levels of equality or inequality.for individuals
and social categories, groups, families, etc.
SELF-INTEREST AND EGALITARIANISM
Several inter-related propositions regarding self-interest as
a dynamic in social welfare policy have been pursued, above. Support
has been drawn from social science literature and a model for study-
ing social welfare policies has been reviewed. The bilateral exchange
in social welfare relationships has been discussed, the self-interest
dynamic has been observed in theory and example and a model aimed at
the education of. decision-making elites to newly perceived self-interests
has been considered. In the balance of this discussion we will demon-
strate the application to present day problems and policies.
First, some consideration is given to two fundamental differences
in the conceptualization of egalitarianism; next, some examples from
school desegregation and black-ethnic group similarities in voting
behavior are examined; lastly, some speculative and hypothetical ap-
plications of the self-interest propositions are applied to the present
condition of the American Indian.
Corrective vs. Redemptive Egalitarianism. This paper is not
aimed at providing a rationale for a utopian scheme. Rather, it
is aimed at exploring a proposition that self-interest is a dynamic
in social welfare policy formulation. The proposition is pursued
here in the spirit of distributive justice and not in the spirit of
a utopian leveling of differences. In a critique of Rawls' A Theory
of Justice, (Rawls, 1971), Charles Frankel makes the distinction
between the two orientations quite clear (Frankel, 1973), Frankel
notes that there are vast differences between what he calls
"corrective egalitarianism" and "redemptive egalitarianism". Re-
demptive egalitarianism is said to try to solve the age old problem
of evil; a transcedent harmony is seen as the end of social activity
in which the moral imperative is the leveling of differences among
people; in rather deterministic fashion, redemptive egalitarianism
is said to be aimed at restoring things to their "original design".
On the other hand, corrective egalitarianism is said to be
primarily concerned with distributive justice. In more indeter-
minant fashion, corrective egalitarianism would permit idiosyncratic
differences and individual initiative, but not without justice.
Frankel contends that the real question is:
which equality are you for, and what kind of
inequality are you willing to accept as its cost.
(Frankel, 1973: 57).
Frankel generates some interesting speculative questions.
First, he notes that some say that women cannot have equality as
long as marriage, home and family are perceived as primary roles.
Yet, how does one satisfy the individual who precisely wants those
things in life? Does she become, then, the psychologically and soc-
ially disadvantaged person who is the target of leveling social
policies. Or, as a second example, are "opportunities to kill oneself
with cigarettes.. less important than opportunities to kill oneself
with overwork?" (Frankel, 1973: 57). Should we keep one category
going with rebuilt hearts or repeated surgery or expensive drugs,
and, [meanwhile], let another category starve? (Frankel,1973: 58).
Thinking in terms of the utility of educating the policy making
elites to newly perceived self-interests, such questions, and such
differences in the popular desideratum of which type of egalitarianism
is desired, are crucial to which incentives are "salable" as new self-
interests. The selection of newly perceived self-interests need not
be seen as a baseline leveling but, rather, a choice among alternatives
aimed at a more just egalitarianism.
The Incentives of School Desegregation. In a midwestern
community involved in debate over the desirability of a public
school racial desegregation plan then in effect, some examples of
conscious and purposeful appeals to self-interest were observed.
When local and state-wide organizations made efforts to persuade
the public (i.e., community voting policy elites) of the disutility
of school desegregation, a counter move was made by the prodesegre-
gation groups. When it was clear that the state council of parent-
teacher organizations was being pressured to endorse a resolution
condemning "busing", the prodesegregation groups developed, dis-
tributed and interpreted materials clearly aimed at educating the
policy makers to newly perceived self-interest while meeting in
state conventions. For example, a one-page flyer was distributed,
often in personal face-to-face contact, which made visible the
benefits of the policy option (i.e., school desegregation).
Benefits of the policy option of desegregation were identified, such
as the fact that the particular school system had laid claim to over
one-fourth of the total Emergency School Assistance Act funding al-
located for the entire state in that particular year due to the
community's instituting of the plan. The group made note of the
opportunities to obtain specialized staff so as to provide indivi-
dualized instruction and the realized opportunities in obtaining
needed equipment. Perhaps the incentive appealing to the broadest
range of self-interests was the noted reduction of violence and
absence of school closings due to disturbances, which were inventoried
and cataloged for the three years prior to the plan. The new awareness
that, in the first year of the racial balance plan, no school had
closed early and no child had to miss a day of school was exceedingly
persuasive in its appeal to the self-interest of those deliberating
on the proposed resolution, which was subsequently removed from
agenda consideration.
Incentives of Black-Ethnic Voting Coalitions. It is commonly
assumed that the political goals of ghetto blacks and clustered
groups are non-distributable. In an analysis of voting data, Howard
Palley concluded that:
in certain particular cases commonality of
interests transcends ethnicity and seems to be
related to class interests. If such perceived
commonality can be combined with an issue em-
phasis that transcends class interest and
emphasizes 'the common interest' in social de-
velopment, a political strategy sufficient to
bring about major social development will be
achievable. (Palley, 1973: 252-3).
Noting that conflict among ethnic and class groups sharing common
interests often contributes to their political impotency, Palley
suggests that the perceived commonality offers the possibility of
an intraclass and interclass coalition focused upon social devel-
opment. While the potential requires further exploration, perhaps
around selected promising issues, the data suggests that education
to newly perceived self-interests is a useful dynamic in potential
coalition.
Incentives for a new Indian policy. While native American
Indians cannot accurately be referred to in the collective gener-
ality of a "new Indian policy", the sense here is that there may be
egalitarian opportunities for a variety of reservation and off-
reservation tribes and individual citizens to be obtained in iden-
tifying newly perceived self-interests for those who hold decision-
making power.
For example, in seeing the federal government as a decision-
making elite, the Department of the Interior recognized that it
can no longer tolerate the embarrassment of not providing protec-
tion of Indian natural resources (e.g., oil and grazing lands) and
in the unilateral exploitation of water rights. The Wassaja News
has, ironically, pointed out that Indians fear termination of the
special relationship they have with the federal government because
this would mean an end to treaty obligations and "natives would be
at the mercy of industrial and agricultural interests". (Wassaja,
1973b: 19). The newly perceived bilateral interests of Indians
(i.e., resource control) and the federal government (i.e., image
maintenance)may alter the posture of the Department of the Interior
maintained since the federal takeover of Indian domains.
New contractual horizons between ranchers and industrial
interests and various tribes cannot be dismissed lightly as utopian
thoughts. While such possibilities would necessarily be approached
with caution, we are reminded of the multilateral beneficiaries
developed out of the cooperative activity of the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA). The original TVA area was a forty per cent black
population (Duffus, 1944). Although the benefits accrued to that
group are certainly questionable, they are not inconsequential. To
be sure, multivariate interests were variously perceived and realized
in TVA, such as the multiplication of paycheck income, increased
quality in food production, removal of the threat of flooding, business
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income increases, less dependence upon government for residual care,
etc. (Lilienthal, 1953). A review of history could be more than
an intellectual exercise in search of new policy options. The poten-
tial here for multilateral self-interests to be served in "Indian
nations" should not be ignored.
IMPLICATIONS
Contrary to common belief, social welfare policies aimed at
the management of social problems can be seen as bilateral or
multilateral transfers of wealth or privilege from one population
category to another. Such policies are not only provided out of
the largesse of dominant groups. Such policies alter the domains
of life conditions which manipulate the patterning of statuses and
rights among classes and categories of people and are far more than
altruistic expressions of collective concerns for needy individuals.
A major conclusion offered by this review is that newly per-
ceived self-interests, as they become possible and observable by
dominant decision-making elites, is a potential dynamic for more
egalitarian social welfare policy choices and outcomes. Preoccupa-
tion with altruistic explanations for social welfare programs, or
continued reliance upon moral exhortation, have done little to alter
the patterning of the relationship between social problems and
social welfare policy. Perhaps we have made so little progress
toward developing an integrated problem/policy theory since we have
begun and continued with false propositions regarding altruistic
incentives and strategies of moral exhortation. The self-interest
construct may offer a useful reformulation of possible opportunities
for egalitarianism in distributive justice in majority-minority inter-
relations.
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